shown that the assumed hardness of the one-more Paillier inversion problem leads to a proof that the proposed identification scheme achieves security against concurrent impersonation attack.
Introduction
Paillier's cryptosystem [1] belongs to the family of probabilistic encryption schemes ushered by Goldwasser and 宋焰:多一次 Paillier 求逆问题与并发安全的鉴别方案 1759 N Micali [2] who introduce the notion of probabilistic encryption. The probabilistic encryption scheme originally proposed by Goldwasser and Micali is based on the quadratic residuosity assumption. Cohen and Fischer [3] improve the limited communications bandwidth of the Goldwasser-Micali scheme. The encryption scheme in Ref. [3] is based on the prime residuosity assumption, however the decryption procedure is inefficient since it involves a certain sort of exhaustive search. Naccache and Stern [4] suggest a variant on the Cohen-Fischer scheme, their scheme allows for high communications bandwidth, and is semantically secure under the same assumption (namely the prime residuosity assumption). Independently, Okamoto and Uchiyama [5] propose an improvement on the Cohen-Fischer scheme, using a different group structure and the semantic security of the Okamoto-Uchiyama scheme is proved under the p-subgroup assumption. Paillier [1] proposes a new candidate trapdoor one-way function and presents a new probabilistic encryption scheme based on it. The semantic security of Paillier's encryption scheme is proved under the decisional composite residuosity assumption (in contrast to the prime residuosity assumption). Paillier's encryption scheme is more efficient than the aforementioned schemes. Following Ref. [1] , many related works have been done, mainly being concerned with modifications, extensions, or applications of Paillier's cryptosystem (see, e.g., Refs. [6−10] ).
In this paper, we revisit Paillier's trapdoor one-way function, focusing on the computational problem underlying its one-wayness, namely the Paillier inversion problem. We formulate a new computational problem that we call the one-more Paillier inversion problem. It is a natural extension of Paillier inversion problem to the setting where adversaries gain access to an inversion oracle and a challenge oracle. We study the relation between the proposed one-more Paillier inverseon problem and the one-more RSA problem introduced by Bellare et al. in Ref. [11] . We show that the one-more Paillier inversion problem is hard if and only if the one-more RSA problem is hard, that is, in regard to intractability, the one-more Paillier inversion problem is equivalent to the one-more RSA inversion problem. Based on this, we next propose a new identification scheme that can be viewed as derived from a Σ-protocol (cf. Ref. [12] ) for proof of knowledge of pre-image under Paillier's function. We show the assumed hardness of the one-more Paillier inversion problem leads to a proof that the proposed identification scheme is secure against concurrent impersonation attack. Compared with the known RSA-related identification schemes, the proposed identification scheme is only slightly inefficient than the well-known GQ scheme [13] , but is more efficient than Okamoto's [14] .
The One-More Paillier Inversion Problem
In this paper, we adopt the standard notations for algorithms and probability spaces (cf. Ref. [15] pp.171~173).
Throughout this paper, we let positive integer k denote a security parameter. As done in Ref. [1] , we fix an RSA-type key generator, denoted by Key(), in the sequel. The generator Key(), on input k, returns (N,e,d) consisting of a modulus N, an encryption exponent e, and the matching decryption exponent d. The modulus N is k-bit long, and is a product of two distinct odd primes; the encryption exponent e equals to N; the decryption exponent d is the multiplicative inverse of N modulo λ(N), the least common multiple of p−1 and q−1.
The Paillier inversion problem
In this section, we review and formalize the Paillier inversion problem underlying the one-wayness of Paillier's trapdoor one-way function. 
The one-more Paillier inversion problem
In this section, we propose a new computational problem related to the Paillier inversion problem, which we call the one-more Paillier inversion problem. This problem can be thought of as a natural extension of the Paillier inversion problem, and is analogous to the one-more extension of the RSA problem in Ref. [11] .
We denote by I() the inversion oracle which on input an element z in , returns the pre-image of z under 
The Equivalence
In this section, we investigate the relation between the one-more Pailler inversion problem and the one-more RSA problem in Ref. [11] . We show that in regard to computational intractability, these two problems are polynomially equivalent; namely, the one-more Paillier inversion problem is hard if and only if the one-more RSA problem is hard. This suggests that the new computational problem may serve as a useful primitive in designing cryptographic mechanisms, as will be demonstrated in Section 4. 
The Concurrent Secure Identification Scheme
In this section, we present a new identification scheme, named Protocol csID, that can be viewed as derived from a Σ-protocol (cf. Ref. [12] ) for proof of knowledge of pre-image under function Π (see Section 2). As a demonstration of its utility, the assumed intractability of the one-more Paillier inversion problem enables us to prove that the proposed identification scheme is secure against concurrent impersonation attack (see, e.g.,
Refs. [16, 17] for formal definitions and further discussion). Compared with the known RSA-related identification schemes, the proposed identification scheme is only slightly inefficient than the well-known GQ scheme [13, 17] , but is more efficient than Okamoto's [14] .
The parameter generator for the identification scheme is described as follows: On input k, first run Key(k) (see Let l be the number of prover instances with which V interacts. When V finishes with some piece of state information σ, adversary A has made l queries to its inversion oracle I() (to get the l(k) pairs (a i ,b i ) of pre-images), and has asked for a total number l(k)+1 of challenge queries. Recall that A's goal is to invert all these l(k)+1 target points (namely, ), while making at most l(k) queries to the inversion oracle. So at this point, A cannot 1 , ,..., U W W l make use of its inversion oracle any more, and instead it tries to extract the pre-image (x,y) of U out of P, since in that case, the pre-image (x i ,y i ) of all the remaining numbers W i can be computed as Now, adversary A executes the following procedure to compute the pre-image (x,y) of U: Run P to get its first message W, issue a random challenge , run P to obtain its response, and execute the verifier's checking procedure. Then, select a second random challenge , rewind P to get back a second response, and again evaluate It is the desired pre-image of U under function Π. In any case, when we successfully extract the pre-image of U, adversary A can invert all the l(k)+1 points , but queries its inversion oracle only l(k) times, 
(Here we used the fact that for any random variable X, (EX)
, where E() denotes the mathematical expectation.) From that we see
To 
Conclusion
We formulate a new computational problem, called one-more Paillier inversion problem, which extends the Paillier inversion problem underlying the one-wayness of Paillier's trapdoor one-way function [1] . We investigate the relation between the proposed computational problem and the one-more extension of the RSA problem by Bellare et al. in Ref. [11] and prove that in regard to computational intractability, the one-more Paillier inversion problem is equivalent to the one-more RSA inversion problem. We also propose a new and efficient identification scheme which is shown to be secure against concurrent impersonation attack under the intractability assumption of the one-more Paillier inversion problem, as a demonstration of its utility as a cryptographic primitive.
